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ABSTRACT

An important source of legitimacy for all types of government is the creation of or
building up of a sense of nationhood for the citizens of the state. This can be achieved in
many ways, including through the use of physical nationalist symbols. In my paper, I
address this topic by exploring how the Communist government of Czechoslovakia
reinterpreted and changed the traditional meaning of the historical Bethlehem Chapel in
Prague in order to fit their own ideology. I found that the Communist government
emphasized the communal aspects of the Hussite movement and ignored religious
associations. My research is primarily historical, with a focus on the role and importance
of the Chapel in Czech history and how this significance influenced it’s rebuilding by the
antireligious Communist government in the early 1950’s. This research is significant
because it demonstrates how a government encourages nationalism by emphasizing
certain aspects of a symbol in order to change its meaning.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

For many visitors to the historic city of Prague in the Czech Republic today, there
are a number of historical buildings and attractions to visit. This includes landmarks from
Prague Castle to the Astronomical Clock in Old Town Square, with many of these
locations dating back earlier than the 13th century. One of these buildings, located a few
minutes walking distance from Old Town Square, is the moderately sized Bethlehem
Chapel. While the structure that stands today was built in the mid-20th century, the
significance of the Chapel dates back to the early 15th century. Its importance revolves
around its connection to the religious reformist Jan Hus, who preached in the Chapel for
over a decade following its construction. Today there are no permanent religious services
held in the Chapel, but many events as well as regular tours are held there; the
government also occasionally hosts state events in the Chapel. While the history of the
building is centuries old, the current building itself is a reconstruction from the 1950s
conducted by the Communist government, who had taken power in 1948. Interestingly
enough, the atheistic government – whom had been taking active steps against the church
even while the Chapel was being rebuilt – had decided to reconstruct the Chapel in order
to incorporate its association with Jan Hus into a broader attempt to connect Communist
ideology to Jan Hus’s teachings and movement. The government had been struggling
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with integrating and connecting Communist ideology to Czech identity; while the party
had experienced its strongest support during the last free elections in 1946 prior to their
coup in 1948, they still only managed 38% of the vote in an election with a 94% turnout.1
This meant that 62% of the population didn’t support the Communist Party and its
platform, and the Party’s forceful takeover of the government during the coup didn’t
shrink this percentage. This made a societal reform as well as a political and economic
one imperative for the new government. In order to better gain real support and integrate
Communist ideology with society, the party had decided to incorporate existing symbols
and places of Czech identity into Communist identity. For them, the Chapel was an
important enough symbol of existing Czech identity, due to its connection to the
historical reformist Jan Hus, that they could mold it to fit their pursuit of a broader
national identity, despite the inherent conflict between the religious symbolism of the
Chapel and the atheistic ideology of Communism. For my paper, I will take a look at how
the Communist government attempted to reconcile these differences and re-interpret the
traditional meaning of the Chapel to fit the broader national identity it was attempting to
create.
An important goal for the stability of a government of a state is to develop
multiple sources of legitimacy; which is the right and acceptance of this body to govern a
state. Without legitimacy, a government is at risk of losing support or even completely
losing control over its territory and population. A government can draw upon multiple
sources of legitimacy; the strength of the economy, recognition by outside states, popular
sovereignty or even military might. However, another vital source is the formation of a
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Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos,
2010, pg. 142.
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coherent identity in support of the state. The Governance and Social Development
Resource Centre (GSDRC), an organization of international think tanks and other
institutions, notes that a shared identity is vital to legitimize the state, exclaiming: “Such
[government] institutions must also resonate with societies in order for them to be
considered legitimate and to become embedded in society.”2 States without established
governments, states that are newly formed, and states that have recently experienced a
regime transformation often face the difficulty of governing a territory filled with a
variety of ethnic groups, nations, and ideologies, many of which have their own interests
and aspirations that could undermine state stability. This makes forming a more
encompassing, coherent national identity that complements the ideology of the state
important in the process of unifying the population and more completely assuring the
legitimacy of the government. As the GSDRC also notes, a state that is fragmented into
multiple competing groups is a state that is constantly weakened by its own citizenry.3
For my paper, I will consider how a government uses identity formation through
nationalism to provide legitimacy after a regime change; more specifically, my research
question revolves around how a new government in an existing state uses previously
existing sources and symbols in order to help contribute and create a sense of national
identity. For my paper, I want to concentrate on the efforts made to incorporate and
reinterpret traditional symbols of Czech identity into the Communist ideology of the new
government of Czechoslovakia formed from a coup in 1948. Specifically, I want to
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examine the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Bethlehem Chapel in Prague, which
started in 1950 and finished in 1954.
So, why is Bethlehem Chapel an interesting case study of the process of
reinterpretation by new regimes? Firstly, the Chapel itself is a strong symbol of Czech
identity through its association to the religious reformer Jan Hus. Jan Hus lived in the late
14th to early 15th century in Bohemia (part of the traditional Czech Crown lands), and
was notable for being one of the first to break from the Catholic Church. His teachings
began the Hussite movement, and his death in 1415 at the hands of the Catholics was one
of the main causes of the Hussite Wars in the mid-15th century. While nationalism was
very different during Hus’s time period, this did not prevent him from becoming an
important nationalist symbol for Czechs in the 19th and 20th centuries. Many of Hus’s
followers were Czechs from the area known as the Kingdom of Bohemia, and he became
an important symbol for Czech national identity throughout the centuries; especially
during a nationalist revival while still under Habsburg control in the mid to late 19th
century. As the Habsburg Empire weakened and loosened restrictions on ethnic
minorities, the Czechs began to revive their language as well as revisit the Hussite era. As
Bakke notes, texts and writings on the time period had been restricted to the Catholic
perspective. The image of Jan Hus was also brought up as a nationalist symbol during
the inter-war period in the early 20th century. Bethlehem Chapel was an especially
important symbol of Hus because it was where he carried out many of his early sermons.
However, the rebuilding of the Chapel by the Communist government is surprising due to
its strong religious association – not only is it a symbol of the religious Hussite
movement, but it is the place where Hus shared many of his first sermons. This is
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significant because religion itself was not accepted into communist ideology; it was seen
as a barrier between the development of an egalitarian society, and a method used to
prevent revolution of the working class. Karl Marx himself describes religion as just a
method used by capitalists to exploit the common man, noting: “Law, morality, religion,
are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many
bourgeois interests.” The Czech government did not ignore this anti-religious aspect of
their ideology and took measures to reduce the importance of religion in society. Luzy
and Navratilova note the aggressive campaign carried out against religion by the
government: “Before 1989, all public functions of religion were suppressed on purpose,
and religion itself was atheistically interpreted and devaluated as a mere 'anachronism'. A
large range of priests were imprisoned or executed, church orders were abolished, church
property was confiscated and the life of religious organisations was submitted to state
surveillance…” Thousands of church dignitaries were arrested, including over 10,000
nuns and 2,000 monks. While there is plenty of literature available on the history of
Bethlehem Chapel, there is little literature that looks deeply at the motivations of the
Communist government for rebuilding the Chapel, and how they used the Chapel once it
was rebuilt. So why would a government that was ideologically opposed to religion use a
religious symbol to help build a national identity? What made the Chapel significant to
the Communists, despite its religious symbolism? Assuming Jan Hus’s legacy not only
centered on religion, how did the government emphasize those aspects and de-emphasize
Hus’s religious legacy? Consideration of these questions will show how the Communist
government was able to reinterpret Bethlehem Chapel in order to reduce its religious
significance and give it an identity that conformed more closely to what the Communists
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wanted it to be. A brief look at some of the challenges that are faced by the latter
compared to established ones is also helpful when considering which nationalisms are
available for use, which may vary according to the particular circumstances of the state;
such as the type of government, process of secession, level of economic development,
and ethnic diversity. The literature related to this topic focuses in particular on postcolonial African and Asian states, post-Soviet bloc states, as well as recently independent
African and Middle Eastern states. For the purposes of the paper, I will be focusing on
examples from Central European states, Czechoslovakia in particular. It is important to
explain what is meant by a newly formed state; while there is not a single agreed upon
definition, scholars generally include those that are in the first 15-30 years of the their life
(although it must be noted that nation building is an on-going process for all states). Most
of the focus by scholars is from 1945 to the present, as this period saw the some of the
greatest increases of new nation-states compared to the centuries before. However, the
creation of new states in Central Europe following World War I is also a point of study.
Before considering nationalism and how a state uses it, it is important to come up
with a basic and broad definition of “nation” and “nationalism”4. Motyl notes that the
concept of nationalism (and also the concept of the nation) is “…a word that resonates
with a number of different meanings.”5 The most basic definition describes nationalism
as efforts to promote a certain nation, ideology, or state. However, Motyl also notes that
it is important to narrow the definition of nationalism based on whom is using it. He
gives multiple definitions of nationalism and nationalists, including the pursuit and belief
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in a national identity, the pursuit of the nation-state, and the pursuit of the well-being of
the nation above all else.67 Nationalism by a new state often means forming a new
identity by building upon and incorporating already existing national identity. For the
purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on this definition, with specific focus on how a
government uses nationalism for this purpose.
While there are various forms of nationalism, they are often expressed through
similar means. Celebrations, literature, pamphlets, public speeches, education, and
government policy are examples of methods that states use to express and build up
different forms of nationalism and socialize their audience in a particular manner. History
plays an important part in this; historical symbols are often an important part of building
a national identity, and are critical in influencing what type of national identity the state
will decide to pursue. As Claire Sutherland mentions with respect to the influence of
history on types of nationalism, “Nonetheless, the question of origins does matter to how
nationalists and nation-builders define their respective nations.”8 History can also
include important elements of culture and dates in the established or new state, which
helps connect a populace even more to the desired identity of the state. Religious history
and culture of nations within a new state can also serve as an important indicator of what
nationalisms a government might use, whether it be to acknowledge and increase the
influence of religion or, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, to reduce the influence of
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23.
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religion. Keely Stauter-Halsted also notes the importance of historically significant dates
as a way for the state to express its desired nationalist rhetoric, mentioning “…nations are
commonly characterized as coalescing at particular historical moments from a
combination of uniquely ‘modern’ forces.”9 It’s important to note that the process of
selecting and emphasizing certain figures and events for nationalist purposes is often an
elite driven process, meant to be used to aid in consolidating power through greater
legitimacy. This is evidenced by the fact that states often mold history to fit their needs,
downplaying or building up certain elements of historical figures and events based on the
type of nationalism and the rhetoric of that nationalism that states wish to use. For
example, Cynthia Paces mentions how the new Czech government during the interwar
period in the 1920’s initially stressed the importance of the historical figure of Jan Hus, a
protestant religious figure, only to downplay him and encourage St. Wenceslas as another
nationalist figure in order to appeal to the Catholic citizens of the country.10 11
For new states, who often lack a concrete and established history to draw upon
and channel nationalist rhetoric through, the challenge of forming a national identity is
even greater. Some new states will choose to cling to any tradition they can find,
attempting to cobble together evidence of a much older nation than what might actually
exist. Weber describes this method of gaining legitimacy as an ‘appeal to tradition’,
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Keely Stauter-Halsted, “Rural Myth and the Modern Nation,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of
Commemoration in Hapsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, ed. Maria Bucer and Nancy Wingfield
(United States: Purdue University, 2001), 153.
10
This was necessary due to the fact that the Catholic minority was significant and expressed outrage over
the promotion of Jan Hus and apathy by the state towards significant Catholic figures. In order for the
new Czech government to maintain stability, they chose to focus more on significant Catholic figures for
nationalism imagery – although they did pick and choose what symbols they wanted to focus upon; for
example, the patron saints in Wenceslas square were ignored.
11
Cynthia J. Paces, “Religious Heroes for a Secular State,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of
Commemoration in Hapsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, ed. Maria Bucer and Nancy Wingfield
(United States: Purdue University, 2001), 209.
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noting: “…command and obedience are considered to be legitimate if they are in accord
with custom or are 'traditional’.”12 An example of this is the significance of the Moravian
Empire for Czechs and Slovaks. While Eyal notes how this history has been used recently
to promote Slovak state identity, he also notes that it was used to promote shared
Czechoslovak identity, due to the fact that parts of present-day Moravia and Slovakia had
been within its borders: “…Great Moravia was the ‘first common state of Czechs and
Slovaks,’ i.e. the first ‘Czechoslovakia’”.13 As Sutherland also mentions, this focus on
local and traditional custom can lead to an unwillingness to welcome foreigners, or even
those that are perceived to be outside of the sphere of the perceived nation, and lead to a
more exclusive nationalist rhetoric as a whole.14 When lacking a solid history, new states
that had an eventful independence movement will often use the independence process as
a source of nationalist imagery.15
Newly formed states often face significant challenges to legitimacy and nationbuilding that can influence their nationalist rhetoric. This is in part caused by the relative
instability that surrounds the new government after its assumption of sovereign power of
the new territory or from the change of one government system into another. These can
includes ethnic divisions, lack of a coherent shared history, and imposition and influence
of authority by more powerful outside actors. Brubaker defines a “triangle” of challenges
for the newly formed post-Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe in his book
“Nationalism Reframed.” First, the idea of a “core nation”, or the ethnic group that exists
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Craig Matheson, “"Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," The British Journal of Sociology
38, no. 2 (1987), 207.
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Gill Eyal, “Identity and Trauma: Two Forms of the Will to Memory,” History and Memory 16 (2004), 18.
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Sutherland, Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century, 24.
15
Some examples of this would include Estonia, the United States, India, etc.

9

within the state but holds a position of power through its domination of the central
government. Brubaker notes that this nation, despite attempting to assert its legitimacy as
the dominant nation within the state, is often in a more vulnerable position than at first
perceived. This is because of the “legacy of discrimination” that preceded its ownership
of the state.16 A “legacy of discrimination” is the history of subjugation by a nonaffiliated government or power on the ethnic group that has assumed power in the new
state. The Czech’s position in Czechoslovakia is a good example of this; prior to the
creation of the Czechoslovak state, the territory had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and ruled by the Habsburgs. The dominant ethnic group in this Empire had been
Austrians and Germans, and Czechs had been historically subjugated and their culture
and language actively attacked by the Habsburgs. The Hussite Movement, connected
directly with Jan Hus and Bethlehem Chapel, had been seen as an example of the struggle
against this. While they were the dominant ethnic group within Czechoslovakia after its
creation, there were still very significant German and Slovak minorities, leaving them in
a tough situation within the new country and encouraging the government to more
actively promote Czech identity. Brubaker’s second side of the triangle is the challenge
of “external national homelands”. He describes this challenge as one faced by newly
formed states when an external, more established state attempts to assert its own
influence on members of its national group within the newly formed state, claiming a
sense of obligation to “take care” of members located in other states. An external national
homeland can also limit participation of a new state in the global community; exerting
influence economically as well as politically. Czechoslovakia during the inter-war period
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Rogers Brubaker. "Nationalism refrained: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe."
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also experienced this situation with the more powerful country of Germany to a great
degree. The new country still had a significant German population, especially in the
territory along the border of Germany known as the Sudetenland. Germany, led by Hitler
at the time, used their position and apparent concern for the German minorities in this
area to annex this Czech territory, and was even able to remove the Czech government
from negotiations over the acquisition of the territory. Brubaker’s third side of his
conceptual triangle is the challenge posed by ethnic minorities within the newly formed
state. These minorities, Brubaker attests, often campaign for their own rights and
recognition by the state and can sometimes encourage further divisions in society and
discourage the pursuit by the state of a more coherent national identity.17 While
established states can also suffer challenges from ethnic divisions, this challenge is often
more profound in newly formed states because of the weakness of the central government
and “core nation”; as a new state, they have not had enough time to strengthen their
legitimacy by socializing their citizens through a shared sense of identity. Again,
Czechoslovakia also faced this challenge both during the interwar period as well as after
World War II. While the Slovaks had been more willing to work with the Czechs, they
still campaigned for greater independence from the central Czech government; the
German minority had also encouraged more rights and independence, and many had
supported the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany. After World War II, the
Czechs decided to address the impact of this third side of the “triangle” by forcefully
expelling former German-speaking Czechoslovak citizens from the country by the
millions; actions that were known as the “Beneš Decrees”. This increased the power of
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the Czechs and allowed them to more easily exert influence over the remaining ethnic
minorities in the country.
Another challenge for many newly formed states is the lack of an extensive
shared history to draw from for nationalist rhetoric. Established states can draw upon
history and cultural practices and imagery for nationalist celebrations, while new states
often have a more difficult time finding shared experiences to form an identity. New
states are also not able to participate as effectively in global politics compared to older
states, as noted by Ejikeme Jombo Nwagwu in his article “New States in World Politics:
Prospects and Challenges”. While Nwagwu mentions that there are some exceptions, new
states generally don’t have access to the same resources as established ones18, and are
therefore unable to use global influence to enhance nationalist rhetoric; instead, they must
use more locally concentrated forms of nationalism.
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CHAPTER TWO:
TYPES OF NATIONALISM USED BY NEW STATES

This will require some consideration of how various forms of nationalism
employed by established states compare with those employed by a new form of
government in others. One of the biggest concerns for new states are ethnic divisions and
social cleavages. Brubaker notes that the dominant or “core” group of new states are
often in a vulnerable position, as they face the prospect of integrating numerous other
existing ethnic minorities within the new state. This makes policies addressing the
integration of these groups vital, and Brubaker outlines two main models of policy.19
These models revolve around whether or not the state decides to assimilate certain ethnic
minorities, or whether they decide to dissimilate or “reject” ethnic minorities. Scholarship
on ethnic nationalism in new states tend to revolve around these two nationalist positions.
However, some scholars, such as Smith, criticize Brubaker’s models and instead focus on
minority rights and the role of international organizations in shaping the nationalist
rhetoric of new states.20
One of the more aggressive forms of ethnic nationalism used is the forced
assimilation of ethnic minorities into the dominant or desired culture. Brubaker defines it
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as “nationalization is a form of assimilation, that is, of ‘making similar’: it involves
making a target population similar to some reference population, whose putative
characteristics are conceived as normative for the citizenry as a whole.” Some scholars,
such as Galbreath, point out that this is often achieved through government mandated
programs, such as education, language assimilation, and other policies that produce
restrictions on minority participation in civic culture until they have met certain
assimilating requirements. According to Galbreath, the key way a state starts assimilation
of minorities is through the promotion of a national language, as he notes that “…it is
important to point out that language is the one issue central to the naturalization and
education issues.” This is because language differences can inhibit communication
abilities, making education and other assimilation methods less effective. Minorities will
often see this as a challenge to their cultural identity, especially if the state requires that
the desired language be taught while excluding teaching of the minority language
altogether; however, the nationalizing state often sees this as an important part of the
process of integration of a minority community into the dominant identity of the state. In
terms of what minority groups are most likely to be chosen for assimilation practices,
Brubaker notes that minorities that are seen as more similar to the majority group are
more likely to be targeted, while minorities that have a history of dislike by the majority
group will not. Brubaker also theorizes that minorities that have a stronger sense of
cultural identity are oftentimes much harder to assimilate, and the new state will shape
their policies based on this presumption. Assimilation policies tend to be more accepted
and effective over time, with governments often “staggering” requirements to allow for
more gradual assimilation.

14

The actions taken by Communist governments after WWII – including the
Communist Czech government – are a different example of forced assimilation. Instead
of a dominant ethnic group attempting to assimilate ethnic minorities into their culture,
the Communist’s aim was to create a new culture revolving around socialism (“the new
socialist man”) and assimilate all ethnic groups into this culture – including the majority
group. More directly this included an assault on religious traditions and institutions,
which were a significant part of Czech culture and a part of society for the Communists
to attempt to subvert. This significance can be seen just through census results alone according to the 1950 census, carried out only two years after the coup , roughly 92% of
responders identified themselves as belonging to a religion or religious denomination (the
other 8% either nondenominational or didn’t respond), with the vast majority identifying
as catholic. The government also addressed other traditions that didn’t align with
Communist ideology; commemorative holidays created during the inter-war period (such
as a holiday recognizing the Battle at White Mountain) were de-emphasized and
sometimes replaced by Communist holidays, for example. This strategy was very
successful; by the 2001 census, only a little over 20% of respondents identified as
religious, with a significant percentage identifying as atheist.
While some states choose forced assimilation, many others choose the
opposite – “dissimilation”, or rejection, of different minority groups. Brubaker defines
dissimilation as: “Far from seeking to make people similar, it prescribes differential
treatment on the basis of their presumed fundamental difference. Instead of seeking to
alter identities, it takes them as given.” Brubaker reasons that this is primarily achieved
through a harsh nationalist rhetoric towards the targeted minority group, along with
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policies that seek to further separate the group from the identity of the state as well as
prevent them from participating in the government or the bourgeoisie. A more extreme
example of dissimilation in Czechoslovakia, as mentioned previously, was the forced
migration of former German citizens out of the country through the Beneš decrees. The
German minority had composed almost 30% of the total population before they were
ejected, resulting in a staggering difference in both total population as well as the ethnic
makeup of the country once the decrees were carried out. The totalitarian nature of the
Communist governments, including in Czechoslovakia, also had an element of
dissimilation; while forced assimilation was more often implemented, the government
was aggressive against any minority or individual unwilling to assimilate and would
execute, imprison, and implement other violent practices against them.
There is a third possible nationalist rhetoric towards minorities that Brubaker
touches upon briefly, and admits may be a more successful one. This is the “minority
rights” rhetoric; which bears some similarity to the assimilation rhetoric. The key
difference between these nationalist methods is that in the minority rights model,
minority groups are given special rights and ability to participate in the government
instead of being assimilated into the dominant culture; benefits can include their own
education institutions, language concessions, and more. It is Brubaker’s very brief
discussion on this rhetoric that draws criticism from David Smith, who contends that this
is a vital rhetoric that deserves more attention. Part of this could be because of a focus on
civic nationalism in new democratic states or states experiencing a regime change to a
democratic system. A good example would be a shift in focus of the new Czech
government that formed in 1990 after the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. Despite
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their totalitarian past (or perhaps because of), the government rhetoric changed from one
that was only accepting of a single ideology to one that promoted the participation of all
minorities in the political community. Vaclav Havel, the first president of the fledgling
democracy, was an especially loud proponent of this; in his first presidential address in
1990, he paints an idealistic but hopeful picture of a more accepting government and
populace: “Masaryk based his politics on morality. Let us try, in a new time and in a new
way, to restore this concept of politics. Let us teach ourselves and others that politics
should be an expression of a desire to contribute to the happiness of the community rather
than of a need to cheat or rape the community.” Instead, Smith puts more emphasis on
the minority rights model. He stresses that their influence is so important that Brubaker’s
model should be modified into a “quadratic nexus” to include international organizations
as another vital actor. Smith surmises that international organizations are vital because
they have the ability to bring attention to minority issues and put pressure on new and
developing states (especially weak states, such as those in the Global South) to institute
more minority rights.
Often connected with ethnic nationalism but also often considered its own form of
nationalism, religion can have an important and profound influence on nationalist
rhetoric. Brubaker gives four different viewpoints on the connection between religion and
nationalism; that religion is connected to ethnic nationalism, that it is its own form of
nationalism, that religion serves to help explain nationalism, and that religion can be a
part of all types of nationalism. Brubaker argues that the connection between ethnic
nationalism and religion revolves around the similar social structures that each has;
namely, as a means of social identification, organizational membership, and political
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claims. He argues it is more accurate to consider the relationship of religion and ethnic
nationalism in this way as opposed to a more direct comparison. Marsh also seems to
agree with this viewpoint; he discusses how religion can function similarly to ethnicity,
used as a nationalist device but also a construct that could serve as a divider in society.
This view of religion and nationalism may relate more closely to Bethlehem Chapel, as
its appeal for Czechs revolved around its religious connection to a protestant reformist, as
opposed to Catholic religious identity. This especially contrasted with the dominant
Catholic religious identity of the Slovaks.
Brubaker also considers how religion might explain parts of nationalism. He
describes this theory as one where religious tradition in a state or community has had a
powerful effect on what forms of nationalism developed over time. He points to the
influence of Protestantism on English nationalism, Catholicism on Polish, Shintoism on
Japanese nationalism, as well as numerous others. Literature has even gone as far as to
consider the role religion has played in the development of nationalism itself, arguing that
it has been central in the evolution of nationalism. Brubaker not only considers the role of
religion in the development of political symbols, but also how significant religious
movements and practices influenced nationalism. Brubaker attests that this newer
understanding of religion’s role in nationalist development supersedes the older argument
that nationalism developed as religion declined; this argument revolved around the idea
that nationalism was the “antithesis” to religion, becoming more prevalent as religion
declined. Recent consideration of the topic, however, argues that the opposite actually
occurred, where the earliest forms of nationalism rose with increased religious fervor.
Brubaker also discusses the argument that religion is its own distinct form of nationalism,
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with its own unique characteristics. In this discussion, he looks at the role of Islam in
many Middle Eastern countries and argues that it can fall into this category, although the
lines are still grey as to whether or not it completely fits the definition.
The final argument is that religion is so closely related to nationalism that it is a
part of it rather than an outside explanation for nationalism. Brubaker points to religious
identities that also double as national identities, such as with Jewish and Sikh nations.
States that prescribe closely to Sharia law may also be included under this umbrella.
Brubaker also notes the case of nationalist political rhetoric in the United States, and how
it often contains religious symbolism and language. Brubaker argues, however, that there
are some problems with this argument; namely, that particulars of language can make it
difficult to determine the level of religious language in nationalist rhetoric, as well as the
argument that it’s possible nationalism influences religion instead of vice versa. It’s
difficult to determine whether or not the use of Bethlehem Chapel as a nationalist symbol
by a government that was anti-religious in all of its other nationalist imagery fits within
this argument. It’s hard to contend that the Communist government was heavily
influenced by religion due to its secular and aggressive campaign against it, but the fact
that it used a religious figure as a nationalist symbol anyways suggests it was influenced
by religion to some degree.
The development of civic culture and use of civic nationalism can also be
important in legitimizing the new government of a state. New states are often faced with
the challenge of encouraging political participation and determining what role civic
organizations should play in society – whether they should be centrally controlled by the
state or almost serve as an alternate, providing services independent of state control.
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Scholars tend to focus on three things when judging what role civic nationalism plays in a
new state: the type of government the state has (especially governments with more rigid
control vs. governments that are more democratic), the perception of government leaders
towards the role of civic culture, as well as the relationship between ethnic and civic
nationalism.
The type of government the new state forms has a large impact on the role
civic nationalism will play – or if it will be even used at all. Many scholars barely discuss
civic nationalism or development of civic culture in new socialist or autocratic states, and
some even define civic nationalism as one used exclusively in democracies. For example,
Stilz argues that “Civic nationhood is meant to describe a political identity around shared
citizenship in a liberal-democratic state.” This argument contends that civic culture and
nationalism is based around the idea that it promotes an “equal” identity, and is also
voluntary, often based around party membership and the role of the leading party versus
other minority parties. Therefore, new states that are autocratic centralize civic
institutions and force party and government identity instead of allowing voluntary
participation. Schoepflin argues that new post-World War II Communist governments
“…eliminated all possible civic institution and codes of conduct, it turned these societies
into civic deserts where the micro-level patterns of behavior were governed by mistrust
and characterized by atomization.” It should be noted that this process was not one that
happened immediately, but often more gradually. While Communist governments did
encourage civic participation, the key difference is that participation was not voluntary.
Also, the totalitarian nature of the governments over society and practices of social
engineering eliminated the possibility of healthy civic institutions. Alternatively, many
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scholars argue that a civic society and nationalism is pivotal for the survival of new
democratic governments. Diamond notes that “Democracy - in particular, a healthy
liberal democracy - also requires a public that is organized for democracy, socialized to
its norms and values, and committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to larger,
common, ‘civic,’ ends. Such a civic public is only possible with a vibrant ‘civil society.”’
In a way, new communist governments attempted to build a vibrant “civil society”
surrounding the Communist Party in order to tighten their hold on power over their
countries, but it lacked the participatory and government-independent nature of many
civil societies in democratic states.
One of the most debated and important aspects of the role of civic nationalism is
the civic vs. ethnic nationalism debate. The original theory, developed by Hans Kohn,
revolved around the difference between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism, also
including a regional distinction of the types of nationalism used in Eastern states and
Western states. Kohn argues that Western democratic states tend to use civic nationalism
while ethnic nationalism dominates Eastern states; and contends that a reliance on ethnic
nationalism encourages more firm autocratic rule while civic is associated with
democratic governments. Lecours expands upon this definition, noting that ethnic
nationalism “views the nation as an organic whole, that is, as a natural and self-regulating
social system…” with the distinction being “Civic nationalism does not equate cultural
homogeneity with nationhood…it does not define the nation using cultural markers but
considers it a community of laws.” This argument contends that ethnic nationalism is
often more culturally exclusive than civic, which seeks to include all groups in society
within the civic culture. The use of Jan Hus and Bethlehem Chapel by the Communist
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government seems to support and contradict this view at the same time, due to the usage
of Jan Hus as more of an ethnic nationalist symbol and not civic. Jan Hus is a symbol that
is significant for Czechs, not other minority ethnic groups in Czechoslovakia such as the
Slovaks and the Hungarians. Hus could even be seen as a symbol against the Slovaks,
considering the anti-Catholic elements of Hus’s identity coupled with the prevalence of
Catholicism in the Slovak minority. The Communists used him as a nationalist symbol to
appeal to Czechs specifically and try and tie in Hus to their national identity. It supports
Kohn’s theory that ethnic nationalism is more often used by autocratic governments as
the Communist government was autocratic and totalitarian. However, it contradicts
Lecour’s assumption in that Communist ideology promotes the idea that there are no
ethnic distinctions or exclusivity, just communist citizens; the government’s use of Hus
as a form of ethnic nationalism in order to appeal to Czechs does not completely align
with this idea.
Finally, focus on civic nationalism and culture in a new state can also
depend on the desires of the political leaders themselves. Some leaders will wish for
more centralized government and emphasize ethnic nationalism and other nationalisms,
while others value development of civil society and will emphasize civic nationalism. A
good example of this would be in the democratic government of Post-Communist
Czechoslovakia, where there was disagreement between Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus
on the role of civil society. Klaus was an influential figure and politician in the new
Czech government as opposed to Havel, whose role as President (largely ceremonial in
the new government system) meant he did not have as strong of influence. Fawn notes
that “For Havel, civil society was fundamental and was the only way to reconstitute
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Czech society,” while “Klaus, by contrast, stressed liberal economics…” According to
Fawn, Klaus wanted more centralization and saw civil groups as a barrier for the
individual to participate in government instead of an important way to develop civic
values. Their conflict is a similar one many new democratic states face when trying to
determine if a strong civil society is vital for a solid democracy.
While all of these nationalisms are significant for the new regime and can often be
connected to other forms of nationalism they used as well as their use of Hus, there is one
I want to examine in particular – the reinterpretation and use of already existing symbols
in order to increase the legitimacy of the new government. For many new regimes, this is
especially important because citizens already have a collective memory and connection to
these existing symbols. Wingfield and Bucur note the importance of this memory in the
creation of a national culture: “Collective memory…becomes an important process for
the creation of community memory and identity, because it is both cultural artifact and
practice.” As mentioned before, this memory can be associated with a variety of physical
symbols – figures, statues, historic places, and others. The challenge for the new
government, then, is effectively incorporating these symbols into the broader identity
they want to create. This can be quite difficult, as not all symbols necessarily contribute
to the desired identity of the state – especially when a state experiences a regime change
that is ideologically different – some may even directly challenge it. Incorporating a
symbol also often means changing its perception; emphasizing certain characteristics of a
symbol while ignoring others
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE NEW GOVERNMENT
Prior to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I,
Czechoslovakia had not been an independent state since its absorption by the Habsburg
Empire centuries before. Even then, it was the first time that a “Czechoslovak” state,
made up of traditionally Bohemian and Moravian regions as well as traditional Slovak
lands, had existed. While Bohemia and Moravia had functioned under a single ruler,
Slovakia had never existed as an independent state and had been tied more closely to
Hungary instead of Bohemia and Moravia. The new Czechoslovak government, officially
formed in 1918, was a relatively stable, if weak, parliamentary democracy. It was able to
carry out multiple elections before the forced annexation of territory by the Germans as a
part of the Munich Agreement in 1938 and the invasion and installation of a puppet
government for the rest of Czechoslovak territory by the Germans the following year.
The country would not gain its independence from the Germans until 1945, and formed a
parliamentary democracy yet again and held elections in 1946; in 1948, however, a coup
d’e tat by the Communist Party led to a Communist takeover of the Czech government,
beginning a regime that would last all the way until its fall after the Velvet Revolution in
1989.
The importance of this inter-war period with regards to the Communist
government’s legitimacy and pursuit of symbolic nationalism in the form of the
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rebuilding of Bethlehem Church is the significance of the Communist movement before
its takeover of the government. The Communist movement within the democratic
Czechoslovak government, in the interwar period as well as the brief period before their
takeover in 1948, was not insignificant; the party had a strong minority within
Parliament. In the 1925 elections, it was second largest party in terms of seats in the two
parliamentary chambers, holding 12% of seats, with just a one percentage point
difference between it and the majority party, who held 13% of seats.21 While this
percentage went down in the elections afterwards (but prior to German occupation) the
party was able to consistently maintain at least 10% of the vote. Despite its ban by the
Nazi government during its occupation of Czechoslovakia in World War Two, the party
held its strength, and even gained support; in the 1946 elections (just two years before the
coup) the Communist Party won the majority of seats, gaining 31% of the vote and
almost half of available seats in Parliament.22 The party’s success could have been partly
driven by veiled concessions to the democratic system of the state as well as
capitalization on anti-German and anti-Hungarian feelings within the populace. Klement
Gottwald was party chairman at the time, and his statement of policy as Prime Minister
following the elections reveals these appeals to the public. He states: “The new
Constitution will emphasize that the Republic is a national state of the Czechs and
Slovaks. The transfer of Germans and Hungarians and the resettlement of the border
districts by Czechs and Slovaks must culminate in a constitutional guarantee that only the
Czech and Slovak nations will in future decide in all public and national affairs…” In this

21

"Elections in Europe; a Data Handbook," Reference and Research Book News 25, no. 4 (2010): Reference
and Research Book News, Vol.25, 471.
22
Ibid.

25

statement he also makes some concessions, promising that the new constitution would
uphold free elections and guarantee civil rights, including rights such as freedom of
religion. However, there is some sprinkling of more direct Communist Party policy –
Gottwald mentions that “The new Constitution must also embody the great complex of
decrees on the nationalization of banking, mines, mineral resources, power and the big
and key industries. The new Constitution must disappoint the hopes of all those who
believe that the nationalized economic enterprises will be returned to a handful of big
capitalists.”23 The USSR’s success in liberating Czechoslovakia from German control
also improved perceptions of the Communist Party in the country. These tactics and
reasons meant that the Communists were effective in their campaign to gain support
through the masses, and it was this in part that allowed them to force (relatively
peacefully) the creation of a new Communist government in 1948.
However, despite the fact that the Communists were able to capitalize on public
support in order to carry out their government takeover, their position was still more
tenuous than they had hoped. While the Party had managed to secure 31% of the vote in
the 1946 elections, it was still a long way from an absolute majority of 51%. Opposing
political parties (such as the Social Democrats) had also been able to put up more
resistance than expected, which led to high political tension in the months leading up to
the February coup; and while the coup itself was bloodless, many democratic proponents
were arrested and the Communists had to forcefully remove current political leaders.24
National unity was also fairly weak at the time, as the inter-war government had not had
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a very long period of time to try and form a stronger Czechoslovak national identity
before the German invasion. Also, despite the growth of the Communist Party before the
coup and after, there was still considerable apathy towards the ideology of socialism and
collectivism that made up the core of party values. Zinner notes that motives to join the
party usually revolved around the protection the party could provide as well as the
opportunity, instead of any strong ideological affiliation.25 This is evidenced through
Wightman’s evaluation of recruitment tactics and statistics from before and after the
coup. He notes that the Communist Party had allowed no-restrictions mass recruitment of
individuals right before, during, and for a short time after the coup; this included
recruitment of hundreds of thousands of individuals who had been members of rival
political parties (such as the Social Democrats). As Wightman notes, mass recruitment of
thousands of individuals who had previously professed loyalty to a rival party doesn’t
strengthen the ideological aims of the party.26 Zinner also notes that this lack of a
coherent ideological party identity immediately created significant issues, the most
important which was that “…the Party’s ideological and organizational foundations were
seriously weakened.”27 The Catholic Church also posed problems for the government,
although it had been weakened after the German expulsion from Czechoslovakia from
1944-1950. Prominent members of the Church, who were ideologically at odds with the
government, often refused to cooperate with Party demands. Rabas notes in his study of
the Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia during that time period how “The
Episcopate and the government began conversations, the aim of which was to bring the
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Catholic Church around to publicly recognize the rule of the Communist Party. However,
all the Catholic bishops refused to do this.”28 These issues weakened legitimacy for the
government and made it vital for the new Communist regime to form a coherent national
identity that revolved around their ideology.
However, the Communists had not started from scratch when considering what
existing sources of identity they could use to help build a national identity. During the
mid to late 19th century, while still under Habsburg control (albeit weakening control)
Czechs in Austria-Hungary saw the stirrings of a nationalist revival. Newspapers, groups,
and other frontrunners began renewing old symbols of Czech identity – such as Jan Hus –
and advocating for more recognition of these figures. Orzoff details how a Czech
newspaper from the time called for nationalist monuments to be built: “The paper
campaigned on behalf of patriotic Czech causes such as raising funds to build the
National Theater or the monument to Jan Hus, fifteenth-century religious martyr and
Czech national hero, in Prague's Old Town Square.”29 This dream would become reality
under Tomas Masaryk, the first president of the democratic government of
Czechoslovakia during the interwar period of 1918-1939. Masaryk, who had been
encouraging the use of Hus as a nationalist symbol, set in motion different projects to
commemorate the figure, including a statue of Hus in Old Town Square. Masaryk had
deeply valued Hus as an important symbol of Czech identity even before becoming
president in 1918; Pace mentions that Masaryk “…wrote and lectured extensively on the
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resonance of Hus’s teachings for the modern Czech.”30 Unlike the Communist
government, Masaryk valued the religious legacy of Hus and interpreted the Hussite
movement as evidence of the right to rebel against any oppressor.31 Contained within this
nationalist revival of Jan Hus was something else the Communists thought they could use
– growing anti-Catholicism. For Czech nationalists, Roman Catholic monuments that had
stood for centuries morphed into a reminder of Habsburg oppression, and many were
destroyed during the first few years of the republic, most notably the Marian Column.32
Anti-Catholicism was further heightened through its association with German and Nazi
oppression. Paces, in her article on Catholicism in the Second Czechoslovak Republic,
notes how Catholic iconography was used during Nazi occupation to legitimize German
rule over Bohemia and Moravia.33 Armed with this association of occupation and
Catholicism, as well as the revival of Czech heroes such as Jan Hus, the Communist
government had a base to extend upon for their own nationalist rhetoric. It could
associate itself with “Czech” images and history while claiming that other forces (such as
Catholicism) were not “Czech” and instead foreign influences from the region’s history
as an occupied land.
As mentioned before, there are many ways that a new regime might try and
strengthen legitimacy, and the chosen methods are often based on the most pressing
nationalist needs of the new state. For the new government of Czechoslovakia, this
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included forming an identity around the communist ideology, as apathy towards the
proclaimed values of the party was undermining the strength of the party itself.
Wightman does provide statistics on the demographic makeup of party members before
and after the influx of new members as a result of the coup, and notes that the proportion
of members who were “blue-collar” workers or agricultural workers fell, while
administrative and liberal arts workers increased.34 This, along with the increase of
members who had previously held membership at rival parties, undermined the
ideological coherency of the Party. One thing the government focused on in order to
achieve more acceptance of Communism, other than reduction of Communist Party
membership, was tying the Communist ideology with notable Czech historical figures,
especially the figure of Jan Hus, an early Protestant reformer. Hus was significant for his
more egalitarian teachings, where he criticized the exclusive nature of higher ups in the
Catholic Church. Many of his followers had also practiced socialistic living styles. This is
what made Bethlehem Chapel important to the new government, as it was the Chapel
from where Hus carried out his sermons and began his teachings.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SIGNIFICANCE OF BETHLEHEM CHAPEL
Bethlehem Chapel was built in 1391 in the Bohemian city of Prague, notable for
its simple gothic style and large size for the time (it could hold up to 3,000 people). The
Chapel would not gain significance until the appointment of Jan Hus as preacher in 1402,
an academic who had studied and then taught at Charles University in Prague. Hus would
serve as preacher for the Chapel for ten years, before being forcefully expelled from the
Chapel and Prague in 1412 and executed in 1415 by the Catholic Church. Jan Hus’s place
as an important figure for Czech identity would be earned through the sermons and
teachings he delivered during his time at the Chapel, which would then provide the
backbone for the Czech Hussite movement and Hussite Wars that began soon after his
death. The Hussite wars not only solidified Jan Hus’s place as a Czech hero, but also
gave birth to national figures such as military leader Jan Žižka, King Jirí and Podebrady.
As Fudge notes in his book on the religious and social reform movement that Hus began,
the preacher’s legacy is closely tied to the Chapel itself: “Indeed, apart from his fiery
death in Constance more than thirteen years later, Jan Hus remains indissolubly linked
forever with Bethlehem Chapel.”35
The significance of Hus’s sermons revolve around the criticism he expressed
towards many of the practices of the Catholic Church. Hus argued that practices such as
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restricting the language of sermons to German or Latin, only allowing the Priest to drink
wine during Communion, the use of indulgences, etc. disconnected the common man
from faith and activities in the Church. He also argued that these practices increased class
and elite divisions in society and restricted the common man’s participation in a religion
that should be accepting of all people. He expressed this criticism not only through the
content of the sermons themselves, but also by delivering all of his sermons in the Czech
language. This was significant because, as mentioned before, most Catholic Churches in
Prague did not have sermons in Czech. This allowed many common people who did not
understand German or Latin to participate in his congregation, and helped attract
significantly large crowds. Hus’s use of the Czech language also made him linguistically
significant, not only because of its unique use in a religious setting but also through
revisions he made to the language itself. Fudge notes that “Somewhere in the period from
1406 to 1412 Hus undertook significant revision of the Czech language.”36 Hus was
considered a significant advocate for the religious participation of the general masses,
and an early Protestant reformist. Uhlir summarizes Hus’s historical significance during
an interview conducted by Radio Prague, noting: “Jan Hus tried to increase the
participation of these common folk in the congregation so they would play a more
decisive role in the Church organization.”37 Hus’ teachings became incredibly popular
during his time at Bethlehem Chapel, and many of his sermons drew such large crowds
that the Chapel would be at full capacity.
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Hus’s teachings themselves were a significant part of Czech identity, but what
solidified his place in Czech history was his excommunication and execution by the
Catholic Church in 1415. During the last few years in his role as Chapel priest, Hus had
been taking more aggressive stances against the Church, even declaring executed
religious dissenters martyrs. Fudge recalls an event in 1412 where three men were
executed by the Church after criticizing the use of indulgences in various Churches in
Prague. Following their death, Hus had their bodies brought to Bethlehem Chapel and
declared them martyrs.38 This event and others show Hus’s escalating relationship with
the Church as well as his growing base of support, and contributed to the Church’s
decision to execute Hus in 1415. His death helped elevate his figure not only as a
prominent religious reformer to that of a martyr, and jumpstarted the radical Hussite
movement and Hussite wars, which occurred just a few years later. This movement
became very significant for the Czechs, both religiously as well as politically. Early on
the movement was fairly successful, with Podebrady (a leader of the movement) being
named King in Bohemia after the death of Wenceslaus and the Catholic Church making a
few concessions. While the movement would eventually die down and membership in the
Hussite church dwindle significantly after Catholic domination in the lands decades later,
it still remained an important era for Czech national awareness and identity. Even today,
Hus has remained an important source of pride for Czechs; many see him not only as an
early protestant reformer but also a hero who challenged an authority that was repressing
Czech cultural growth and position in society. Fudge notes: “Both aspects of the life and
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work of Hus bequeathed a legacy to posterity…his name was attached that altered the
shape of religion in Bohemian society with reverberations across Europe.”39
After Hus’s death, the presence of Bethlehem Chapel in the minds of the people
began to slowly fade. While it still held some prominence during the Hussite Wars, the
eventual defeat of the Hussites by the Catholic Church amplified its rate of decline. It was
eventually bought out by the Jesuit order in 1661, and then demolished by the late 18th
century when the order was suppressed by Joseph II.40 As mentioned previously, its
significance as a national symbol would not be revived until Czech nationalism began to
grow in the late 19th century and early 20th century as the grip the Habsburg government
held on ethnic minorities weakened along with the power of the government itself. Hus
became even more important in the 20th century with the formation of Czechoslovakia.
Masaryk, who led the government during this inter-war period, actively promoted Jan
Hus by building a statue and staging events.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE COMMUNIST APPROACH
Bethlehem Chapel (and its connection to Jan Hus) had many associations that
made it an important symbol for Czech identity – religious, linguistic, and cultural. Its
importance also manifested through its image as a physical connection to Jan Hus.
However, despite the many different meanings and associations the Chapel held, there
were certain interpretations the Communists valued above others. While Masaryk had
already started projects and used Hus as a nationalist symbol during the interwar period,
his focus on the early Protestant religious aspects of Hus’s identity wasn’t what the
Communist government wanted to emphasize. Instead, the first and most important was
Jan Hus’s challenge and criticism of the wealth of the Catholic Church, as well as
condemnation of how the practices of the Church disconnected it from the common
people. The new government viewed Hus as a challenger to a class system propagated by
the Church, someone who lifted up the socialist idea of more equal participation of the
masses (the lower class) in a society dominated by the Church (which they saw as a
persecuting upper class). This interpretation was developed and encouraged most
aggressively by Zdenek Nejedly, a Czech Communist who became Minister of Education
in the new government after 1948. Peter Moree briefly summarizes Nejedly’s
interpretation of Jan Hus:
Hus’ programme, according to Nejedlý, had three main points. First, Hus
announced the law of collectivism, which is the principle that everything must be
35

for the well-being of all, not just of one person. The second principle concerns
property. Hus’s criticism of the riches of the church called for a reform of
property which had to be executed with the presupposition that property is not just
there for the benefit of the individual, but for the benefit of all those who need it.
The third point is the equality of the people, especially of the poor as opposed to
the ruling classes. Hus was not just a source of new religious insights, but also the
propagator of a new social order very similar to the socialist order.41

As discussed in the quote, Nejedly saw many of the lessons and criticisms Hus preached
as an early move towards a more socialist society, and a criticism of a society structured
around separation of classes. Hus’s use of the Czech language as opposed to German or
Latin, as well as encouragement towards the masses to criticize segregating practices of
the Church, were all seen as a move to lift up the poorer classes against the wealthier
class. He reasoned that Hus saw the use of language and discriminatory practices by the
Catholic Church – where only a certain Catholic figures could participate – as a way to
subdue lower classes and promote the status of the wealthy in society. His movement
against these practices was thus seen as an early movement towards an egalitarian society
and rebellion against a subjugator. This was especially recognized and emphasized by
Czechs during the nationalist movement in the late 19th century through the post-World
War II period, as it paralleled the subjugation by the Germans and Habsburgs that the
Czechs had suffered under during that time.
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This was not the only aspect of Jan Hus the Communists focused on; the
revolutionary aspects of the Hussite movement itself was also seen as an early attempt at
fulfilling the Marxist ideal of the lower class rising up against the upper class in order to
reform a classist society into an egalitarian one. Bartos makes a note of the Communist
Party’s focus on the Hussite Wars and its association with revolution: “[The Communist
Party] recast the fifteenth-century Hussite wars as a Czech precursor to modern MarxistLeninist revolutions… the Chapel stood as a shrine to the native revolutionary tendencies
of the Czech people.”42 The government also attempted to use this revolutionary aspect of
the Hussite Wars for their own nationalist purposes through reinterpretation of the
existing Vitkov Monument, which had been built by the Masaryk government during the
inter-war period. The monument’s most notable feature was its statute of Jan Zizka, an
important war hero from the Hussite movement. The Communist government continued
to emphasize this monument, but also took a step further by transforming part of the
monument into a mausoleum for Gottwald following his death.43 The government
wanted to tie in these revolutionary, anti-class elements of the Hussite movement into the
inherent revolutionary nature of Communism, and argue that the fight against a class
system was an integral part of Czech identity by comparing the Hussite movement to the
Communist takeover. Moree also notes that the government manipulated this
revolutionary interpretation by tying in anti-German and pro-Slav elements to the Hussite
movement as well.44 The Party also focused on socialist practices of some of Hus’s
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followers during the Hussite movement, namely the radical group at Tabor. The priests
and people of Tabor experimented with an early form of egalitarian society, as Fudge
notes: “In 1419 several mass gatherings occurred in which elementary communist
principles were invoked; everyone was called ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ and social distinctions
were ignored. Food was shared in common, the richer supplying the poor. No difference
was made between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’…”45 Despite the priests and followers of Tabor
being considered a more radical sect of the Hussite movement, the Communists pointed
to them as an example of the socialist nature of the conflict. Together with the
revolutionary elements of the Hussite wars, the Communists argued that Hus’s movement
was an early attempt at Communist revolution.
The government not only wanted to emphasize the socialist elements of Hus’
legacy, but also promote the anti-Catholic elements. As mentioned before, the
government had been trying to take a more active role in reducing religion in society, and
the Catholic Church was proving to be a large thorn in the side of the Party by continuing
to resist these changes. Rabas argues that this resistance was shown partly through
unwillingness by Catholic leadership to accept Communist rule without concessions to
the Church.46 The Communist government also passed several laws that aimed at
instituting regulation over churches, nationalizing church property, and reducing the
control of the clergy over their own congregations. They also took measures to weaken
the Church by arresting prominent leaders – Kaplan notes in his study of the anti-church
measures taken by the government in the early 1950s that: “Out of 17 bishops, 13 were
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either in prison or under house arrest; two were forbidden to carry out their duties; one
was in enforced isolation and only one auxiliary was still performing his episcopal
functions.”47 While laws were a more direct way for the Party to challenge the Catholic
Church, they also took ideological measures to promote historically important symbols
that had anti-Catholic elements – such as Bethlehem Chapel – to argue that Catholicism
was not a core part of Czech identity, but the result of foreign imposition and culture. Jan
Hus’s criticism and movement against the church that he promoted within Chapel walls,
as well as his death at the hands of Church leadership, made Bethlehem Chapel an
important symbol for the Communists to use against the Catholic Church in this way. The
Church itself had already been weakened by the forced expulsion of millions of Germans
from Czechoslovakia, who were mostly Catholic, Rabas notes.48 Catholicism was also
associated with the Habsburgs, another symbol of foreign oppression. There was an
especially strong negative association due to the religious suppression of Protestantism
by the Catholics in the Empire following the thirty years war. The Communists wanted to
take advantage of these anti-German feelings strengthened by Habsburg rule and Nazi
occupation by associating it with Catholicism, publicly but also through symbols such as
the Chapel.
Despite the wealth of associations – socialist, revolutionary, and anti-Catholic –
that the Communists wanted to focus on for the reinterpretation and reconstruction of the
Chapel, they were still faced with the difficulty of divorcing the religious meaning from
the symbol of Jan Hus. To make matters more difficult, the Chapel was itself a religious
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building, and its significance lay in the fact that it was the place where Jan Hus had
delivered his sermons. However, the government still saw the Chapel as an essential
enough symbol and connection to Jan Hus that its reconstruction and reinterpretation was
approved just a few months following the coup in 1948.

40

CHAPTER SIX:
RECONSTRUCTION

When the Communist government took power in 1948, it inherited the
responsibility of addressing numerous problems facing the country post-World War II.
While Czechoslovakia experienced less physical damage of property during the war
compared to other Eastern European states, it still faced issues with rebuilding economic
and state institutions that had been under Nazi control during the war. Fear and
resentment towards the Nazi occupation also spurred the government to forcibly expel
millions of Germans and Hungarians as well as place their property under state control.
Additionally, after 1948, the Communist government only increased the pace of
nationalization of economic institutions and private property – all the while facing a
budget crisis.49 This made it difficult for the government to not only manage the large
amount of businesses and institutions they were taking control of, but also try and create
an adequate compensation system for properties they were nationalizing (although there
were plenty of citizens that were not compensated at all, including expelled Hungarians
and Germans and anyone suspected of collaborating with the Germans while under
occupation).50
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Despite the budget crisis and difficulties associated with the vastly expanded size
of the government, the Party didn’t wait long to approve a plan to rebuild Bethlehem
Chapel. Just five months after the coup, in July of 1948, a meeting was held with the
state’s cabinet and Bethlehem Chapel was listed as a part of the agenda. This showed
how important reconstruction of Bethlehem Chapel was for the new government, as that
same month they had been busy replacing leadership of opposing parties in order to form
puppet parties, had successfully absorbed their largest former rival (the Social
Democrats) into the Party, and had been continuing the process of working through the
additional issues related to nationalization of property.51 After the plan had been set and
funding approved, the state began the process of reconstructing the Chapel.
However, the progression towards rebuilding the Chapel was not smooth. While
the state was set on reconstruction of the building, they had to contend with the fact that
there were already apartment buildings located at Bethlehem Chapel’s historical site. Not
only that, but the government had set the precedent during the nationalization process of
private property that citizens living within a nationalized property could still remain in
their homes, despite the transfer of ownership. In the case of the apartments located on
the site where Bethlehem Chapel would be built, however, forced removal of residents
and destruction of the apartment buildings would be required.52 The government, worried
about the effect forced removal of residents would have on the image of the Bethlehem
Chapel project, decided that they would compensate the owners of the apartments by
offering the enormous amount of 12 million Czech crowns in order to encourage them to
give up their homes freely – and this was only funding to gain the property, much less
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actually rebuild the chapel.53 Considering the budget crisis the state was experiencing as
well as rigid compensation rules for nationalized property of Czech citizens, this was an
incredible amount of money to devote to just the beginning stages of the project. Paces
does note that the state still used threats and a complicated compensation process to
reduce payment amounts, but that their level of cooperation with property owners of the
Bethlehem Chapel site was far above average compared to compensation processes of
citizens of other nationalized processes.54 The main effect of the state’s willingness to
work with and more legitimately obtain the property was a postponement of the project;
while initial plans to rebuild the Chapel had started in 1948, actual demolition of the
apartment buildings and beginnings of reconstruction didn’t start until 1950.
The committee itself was highly focused on accurate and authentic reconstruction
of the Chapel. It was led by architect Alois Kubicek, who had been already conducting
research for possible reconstruction of the building during the interwar period for
Masaryk’s government. Unfortunately, the designers had a difficult time finding
medieval descriptions and drawings of the Chapel; an excavation was conducted to find
fragments of the building that might have shown what materials it was composed of, but
it was largely unsuccessful. However, despite difficulty in producing a completely
accurate reproduction of the chapel, the designs and builders still attempted to make the
new building as close to the original as possible; they even used medieval techniques to
produce ceramics and other materials used in the building.55 The painstaking methods
used to try and reproduce the Chapel as possible (with a few alterations) showed not only
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the government’s efforts to honor the memory in order to make it a more effective
symbol, but also how important the Chapel was for the leaders of the project. The
committee members also made sure to include fragments of the original wall that they
had found through an excavation of the site as well as parts that had been included in the
razed apartment buildings. This reconstruction as well as initial difficulty in obtaining
and demolishing the apartment buildings that had existed in the spot dragged out the
project, and it was not completed until 1954, six years after the initial plans had been set
in motion.

44

CHAPTER SEVEN:
TREATMENT OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCH

Before a deeper discussion on the methods and events the Communists used to
reinterpret the chapel, it must be noted that while the government made efforts to separate
religion from the image of Jan Hus, its rhetoric was not entirely secular. As noted by
Paces: “…the Communists found it difficult to excise completely the religious meaning
of the Hus legend: no matter how many times Czech leaders insisted that Hus had
become a secular figure, it remained impossible to ignore that this man had been a
Roman Catholic priest, who died proclaiming his Christian faith.”56 After all, it is
difficult to remove any religious significance from a building whose original purpose was
as a meeting place for the religious.
Faced with this difficulty, the Communists found it easier to make some
concessions to the Protestant churches in Prague while still making various statements
intended to shift the symbol from an inherently religious one to a more secular one. These
concessions were made only to Protestant churches; the anti-clerical association of Hus as
well as growing resentment towards Catholics due to their relation to Germans who had
been living in the Czech Sudetenland, as well as the Habsburgs, made it easier for the
government to reconcile Hus’s religious identity with Protestants and not Catholics.
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Instead, in this early period the Communists decided to allow a little bit of Protestant
religious identity, such as cooperating with some Protestant churches and not targeting
them as harshly, and instead focused efforts on combating the Catholic Church. As
mentioned before, the Party arrested church leaders, nationalized religious schools, and
focused on banning and censoring Catholic publications and writings. They also
nationalized all church property and required that priest’s salaries be determined and paid
by the state.57 While the full extent of nationalization of church property isn’t known, the
US State Department reported that the post-Communist Czech government was dealing
with a huge request to return land taken by the Communist government to the Catholic
Church: “The Catholic Church is seeking around 700 buildings and 175,000 hectares of
land; state and local authorities hold most of these properties.”58 While the party’s
campaign against the Catholic Church was intense, they did allow some leniency for
certain Protestant churches willing to work with the state. Part of this was because the
Catholic Church policy towards the government was not an accepting one – some
protestant churches (such as the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren [ECCB] and the
Czechoslovak National Church) openly advocated working with the new Communist
government. This willingness to work with the government was not only for selfpreservation; some of the churches – especially the ECCB – saw ideological similarities
between their goals and the goals of the new Czech government. These beliefs revolved
around the Church’s concern for social issues, along with the socialism’s addressment of
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these issues through a restructuring of society.59 A paper produced by Cameron outlining
the history of the ECCB (which had formed in 1918 right at the beginning of the first
Czechoslovak government from a merge of two other Protestant churches) noted how the
Church leadership, in those early years after the coup, saw some value in the Communist
ideology: “Hromadka therefore advocated dialogue with the Marxists, arguing that the
Marxist revolution was a revolt against unjust social orders, not against God…This
committee welcomed the new government, anticipating that it would 'preserve the
deepest traditions of freedom and justice' in Czechoslovakia.”60 The ECCB was also
perhaps more willing to support the government due to its connection to Jan Hus.
Cameron notes that “…the new church traces its roots back to the 15th century and the
beginnings of the church reform movement in Bohemia, associated with Jan Hus.”61
While church leaders were unhappy with the religious crackdown by the government in
the 1950s, they still had a more conciliatory approach towards working with the
government, especially compared with the Catholic Church. For a government with a
shaky sense of national identity, using Protestant churches to promote national identity
through Jan Hus was an effective way to not only encourage anti-clericalism but also get
the attention of citizens who may identify more with the protestant religious aspect of Jan
Hus and the Chapel, especially because of the perception of Catholicism as imposed by
foreign cultures and Protestant as inherently Czech.
The government’s atheistic ideology was not forgotten, however; while they may
have been a little more lenient towards some Protestant churches, they did take measures
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to shift Jan Hus’s religious association to a more secular association. Even when the plan
for reconstruction of the Chapel was announced and the Evangelical church gave its
public support for the project, the Party did not allow any church to be a part of the
development of the project and actual reconstruction.62 Despite allowing some
involvement from Protestant churches, the government’s stance that it alone should
control and influence the reconstruction process might have been because of its fear that
the its involvement with the churches might give the Chapel more religious focus. By
maintaining control over the process and mostly shutting out the churches, it also had
more control over the more secular identity it was trying to give Hus. Also, while the
Party did not treat Protestant churches as harshly as Catholic churches and they did
collaborate to a limited degree on the Chapel project, it also applied many of its new
policies (censorship, nationalizing of church property) to Protestant churches as well.

62

Paces, Prague Panoramas, paragraph 9.

48

CHAPTER EIGHT:
REINTERPRETATION

Despite the reconstruction committee’s pledge to ensure that the reconstruction of
the Chapel was as accurate as possible, there were some liberties taken with the Chapel’s
interior design. Designers - most notably Nejedly – decided to include paintings and
murals along the Chapel’s walls. This is important because research and documents
considering the existence of paints inside of Bethlehem Chapel are very mixed; some are
confident that there were paintings and murals inside of the Chapel during Jan Hus’s time
there, and others ascertain that there is no reasonable evidence that there were any
murals. Fudge notes: “That there were pictures on the walls of Bethlehem is not to be
doubted,” and goes on to argue that images displayed inside the Chapel were most likely
textual murals pronouncing Hus’s teachings and criticizing the head of the Church in
Rome.63 Others, such as Paces and Pavlicek, argue that it’s uncertain if there were any
murals or paintings, and if there were there is no concrete record of what they depicted.64
This was not much concern for Nejedly, who decided to include murals and
paintings inside the Chapel of his and his committee’s design and discretion. They
included a variety of murals, such as quotes from the Richenthal Chronicle (a text that
detailed the Council of Constance in 1415, where the Catholic Church had condemned
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and executed Jan Hus), as well as songs and excerpts from the Hussite Bible,
scenes from the modern Hussite work “The Jena Codex”, as well as a large mural
displaying Hus’s execution.65 While these paintings were created in the present day,
Nejedly tried to add a more authentic touch by having them produced in a medieval style,
and quotations were etched into plaster and projected onto the wall of the Chapel. The
only authentic art piece within the Chapel was a fresco remnant found during excavation,
and it was framed and kept in its fragmented form for display within the Chapel.66
The choices of murals and paintings made by Nejedly and the committee were a
method of reinterpretation in of itself. It should be noted that there was some concessions
made in terms of religious symbolism with these murals and paintings; as noted above,
some of the recreated frescoes concentrated on religious text and images from the Hussite
Bible, and many of the images themselves were styled in a medieval religious fashion.
However, religious symbolism was not the focus of the various murals created and placed
inside the Chapel. Instead, there was a stronger emphasis on the Hussite movement and
wars, as well as the excommunication and execution of Jan Hus by the Catholic Church
at the Council of Constance. This is evidenced through many of the murals they decided
to display – including a depiction of the Hussites in battle against Catholic forces, as well
as the various murals depicting scenes and quotations from the Richenthal Chronicle. As
noted before, this text revolves around the Council of Constance, where Hus had been
burned at the stake by the Catholic Church – showing a continued focus on what sparked
the movement itself as well as the anti-Catholic elements of Hus’s identity. This focus
was even further accentuated through the most striking mural inside the Chapel, a
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depiction of Jan Hus being burned at the stake, surrounded by members of the Catholic
Church. This mural was placed in the most visible space inside the Chapel, right above
the pulpit.67 The choice by Nejedly to include these murals and quotations, despite being
an obvious deviation from the committee’s commitment to recreating the Chapel as
accurately as possible, showed how he was attempting to shift the Chapel’s connection to
Jan Hus’s religious teachings to a connection to the Hussite war and Jan Hus’s death.
This was far from Fudge’s vision of Chapel walls covered in the religious teachings and
criticisms of the Church, produced by Jan Hus himself.68
Six years after the government had approved plans to build the Chapel, the
building was finally finished. To commemorate this event, the government held an
“Opening Ceremony”, where many Party officials, government employees, and the
public attended. The date of the ceremony was on July 5th, on the anniversary of Jan
Hus’s death. The ceremony was not wholly secular - members of the Evangelical Church
of Czech Brethren and Protestant Czechoslovak Church attended, and even performed
various Czech religious hymns.69 At the ceremony, the Chapel was declared a “National
Historic Monument,” and Nejedly gave an emotional speech to the many spectators
gathered within the new building. While the commemoration of the building of a historic
monument was significant, the most important part of this event was Nejedly’s speech.
In his speech, Nejedly outlined the significance of the Chapel and of Jan Hus as
an early Communist reformer, as well as attempted to reinforce the Party’s interpretation
of a secularized Hus versus a religiously motivated Hus. He made efforts to include the
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official Communist interpretation of Hus as a revolutionary and proponent of the
abolition of class, and also made note of the Taborites as well as the anti-Catholic aspects
of Hus’s image. This did not mean that the ceremony and speech was not without
concessions to some of the Protestant churches from Prague; as mentioned before,
representatives of the ECCB and Protestant Czechoslovak Church were allowed to attend
and even perform hymns. The language of the speech itself was also occasionally
religious; Nejedly quoted some of Hus’s sermons and referred to the abuses of the
Catholic Church during the time period as “sins”. He also spent a notable amount of time
on Hus’s criticism of the Catholic Church on their restriction of Communion practices for
the common congregation member.70 Whether or not this religious language was
intentional or a result of the difficulty in divorcing religious concepts from the image of
Bethlehem Chapel and Jan Hus is not really clear.
Despite religious language peppered throughout his speech, Nejedly did make
considerable efforts to paint Hus as a secular figure. He made note of the fact that the
Chapel was not a Church, and even argued that the Chapel wasn’t even a proper Chapel,
quoting some of Hus’s writings where the Chapel was only referred to as “Bethlehem”.
He also argued that structural issues disqualified the Chapel from being such, noting the
lack of a cemetery and pointing to a public well that had existed within the Church
(which the Communists had made sure to include in the reconstruction).71 This was
important because it showed an effort to reduce the religious significance not of Jan Hus,
but the rebuilt location itself. His more substantive argument against the religious
association of Hus targeted the goals of the reformist; he made the argument that Hus was
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only religiously motivated because of the class system’s entrenchment in religion during
that time period. He even argued that Hus would not have been religious in the presentday society, and would have instead targeted class systems without religious teachings
and criticisms. In this way, he was trying to connect the actions of the government
directly to Hus by arguing that a present-day Hus would have targeted the class system
and been atheistic as well, as the class system in the current society was not as
interwoven into religion as it was in the past. Pace also mentions that Nejedly tried to
appeal to the public by including anti-German elements: “But Nejedly also played on
modern anti-German sympathies, quoting a fragment of a sixteenth-century song…he
used this excerpt to remind his audience subtly of Communist sacrifices during the defeat
of Nazi Germany…”72
Nejedly not only targeted Czech fears of the Germans, anti-Catholicism, and the
legitimacy of the Chapel as a religious building, but also the use of Jan Hus as a national
symbol under Masaryk’s government during the interwar period. He criticized Masaryk’s
decision not to rebuild the Chapel, which he argued was an essential part of
Czechoslovak national identity, and made sure to refer to the government’s capitalist
formation within this criticism. Masaryk’s government, which was democratic during the
inter-war period, had decided to refrain from rebuilding the Chapel due to the fact that the
apartments built upon the historical site were privately owned, and they were unwilling to
come up with the funds to convince the various owners of the different buildings to sell
the property to them.73 Of course, Nejedly did not mention this fact within his speech nor
the fact that the Communist government had paid so much to obtain the buildings (as
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well as try and coerce the owners), and instead used Masaryk’s hesitation to suggest that
the Communist government’s dedication to rebuilding the Chapel and promoting Hus’s
image meant that it was (ironically) more “Hussite” and nationalistic than Masaryk.74 He
ended his speech with moving statements about Bethlehem Chapel’s significance for
Czech identity, specifically its significance as the source of an early attempt at
Communist rebellion and revolution. He optimistically applauded the Communist
takeover as a final realization of the Czech’s early attempts at proletariat revolution, and
marked it as a beginning of a shift to Communist style architecture.75
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CHAPTER NINE:
CONCLUSION

Despite Nejedly’s view of Bethlehem Chapel as a vital source of Czech identity
and his optimistic view of how the Chapel would be used in the future, the reality was far
more underwhelming. There is barely any evidence of events being held at the Chapel
while it was under Communist ownership (which lasted until about 1987), and in an
interview about the Chapel, Czech historian Sebek notes that it was “closed to the public”
except from “time to time” for the occasional event.76 An alternative source mentioned by
Hobl describes the Chapel as a busier attraction, noting that it “attracted many visitors
and offered regular tours…”77 Still, Hobl does note that the Chapel was not used to the
extent the Communists had envisioned. She points this out in her dissertation by
mentioning that the only other event held at the Chapel that was widely published was the
540th anniversary of Hus’s death in 1955.78 It’s possible that there were some other
public events and there could have been tours, but it wasn’t significant enough for
announcement by the government. It’s unclear why the Party put so much effort into the
Chapel, only to hardly use it for larger events. It’s possible they had difficulty reconciling
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the religious association of the building, and were worried that allowing it to be used
more regularly would remind the public of its religious symbolism; or perhaps they
thought that a more effective propaganda tactic would be to allow the building to stand as
a monument instead of a functional space (where the religious association might
outweigh the narrative the Communists wanted to portray). None the less, The Chapel
was only fully reopened to the public in 1992, after the fall of the Communist regime.
Today, the Chapel is owned by the Czech Technical University, who renovated
the building and reopened it in 1992 and continue to maintain the building. The Chapel is
not used for many formal religious ceremonies (aside from a commemoration of Hus and
his teachings on July 5th), but is instead the Ceremonial Hall for the University. Events
such as weddings, concerts, and university ceremonies are held there, there are regular
tours for visitors, and it is also occasionally used by the Czech Government for special
events.79 While the Chapel still holds a place in Czech memory, it doesn’t seem to be as
prominent or vital for national identity of the current government as it was for the
Communist government in 1954 – other symbols, such as Prague Castle, Old Town
Square, and the Astronomical Clock – seem to be more vital symbols for the current
government to promote. While it’s difficult to judge how successful the Communist
government was at reinterpreting the Chapel and the symbol of Jan Hus, perhaps this
present day reduced focus on the reformer is a result of lingering confusion on what the
Chapel and Jan Hus represented. The contradicting images of a religious Hus and a
revolutionary, secular Hus may still have significance in how he is considered today and
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could hint that the government’s reinterpretation could actually have been more
successful than at first perceived.
Determining whether or not the reinterpretation was actually successful is a
difficult if not impossible task. One thing is clear, however; the reconstruction of
Bethlehem Chapel was a fascinating and exceptional event when set against the policy
and historical backdrop of the type of government that created it and the time period that
it instituted the project. The Communist government in Czechoslovakia was not one that
instituted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy towards religion; they actively campaigned
against Churches, nationalized church property and turned them into work, storage, or
residential buildings, arrested Church leaders, instituted negative rhetoric against
churches in schools and universities, and much more. The government had also been
faced with the monumental task of managing a budget while overhauling the economic
and political system, nationalizing millions of acres of property, and aiding in the postWorld War II recovery. Despite their active campaign against religion, however, the
government still found it so important to build this Chapel that they not only
reconstructed it within a few years of the coup, but they also spent a considerable sum of
money on the project and tried to make it as historically accurate as possible. This ironic
policy of a government that otherwise tried to secularize a religious country (and was
fairly successful in doing so) illustrates an interesting and unique event, and shows how
important nationalism and the use of existing nationalist symbols can be for a new
regime.
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